A Comparison of Reinforcement Learning Models for the Iowa Gambling Task Using Parameter Space Partitioning by Steingroever, Helen et al.
The Journal of Problem Solving • volume 5, no. 2 (Spring 2013)
1
A Comparison of Reinforcement Learning Models for the  
Iowa Gambling Task Using Parameter Space Partitioning
Helen Steingroever,1 Ruud Wetzels,2 and Eric-Jan Wagenmakers1
Abstract
The Iowa gambling task (IGT) is one of the most popular tasks used to study decision-
making deficits in clinical populations. In order to decompose performance on the IGT 
in its constituent psychological processes, several cognitive models have been proposed 
(e.g., the Expectancy Valence (EV) and Prospect Valence Learning (PVL) models). Here 
we present a comparison of three models—the EV and PVL models, and a combination 
of these models (EV-PU)—based on the method of parameter space partitioning. This 
method allows us to assess the choice patterns predicted by the models across their 
entire parameter space. Our results show that the EV model is unable to account for a 
frequency-of-losses effect, whereas the PVL and EV-PU models are unable to account for 
a pronounced preference for the bad decks with many switches. All three models under-
represent pronounced choice patterns that are frequently seen in experiments. Overall, our 
results suggest that the search of an appropriate IGT model has not yet come to an end.
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The Iowa gambling task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) is a popular 
neuropsychological paradigm used to assess decision-making deficits in clinical popula-
tions. The IGT was originally developed to detect decision-making deficits of patients 
with lesions to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), but in the last two decades 
it has been applied to a variety of clinical populations, such as patients with pathological 
gambling disorder (Cavedini, Riboldi, Keller, D’Annucci, & Bellodi, 2002), attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (Agay, Yechiam, Carmel, & Levkovitz, 2010; Toplak, Jain, & Tan-
nock, 2005), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Cavedini, Riboldi, D’Annucci, et al., 2002), 
psychopathic tendencies (Blair, Colledge, & Mitchell, 2001), bipolar disorder (Brambilla 
et al., 2012), and schizophrenia (Martino, Bucay, Butman, & Allegri, 2007; Premkumar et 
al., 2008). In addition, the IGT has been applied to cocaine addicts (Stout, Busemeyer, Lin, 
Grant, & Bonson, 2004), chronic cannabis users (Fridberg et al., 2010), traffic offenders (Lev, 
Hershkovitz, & Yechiam, 2008), and inmates (Yechiam, Kanz, et al., 2008). 
The task contains four decks that differ in their payoff scheme. Participants are told 
to choose cards so as to maximize their net profit. The only way to accomplish this goal 
in the IGT is to avoid risky decks that contain high immediate rewards but even higher 
occasional losses, and instead prefer safe decks that contain small immediate rewards 
but even smaller occasional losses. Impaired performance might be caused by several 
factors, such as focusing on immediate rewards, avoidance of losses, or bad memory for 
experienced payoffs. Thus, the IGT intends to measure the extent to which participants 
learn to prefer decks that maximize their long-term outcomes. 
In order to provide insights into the psychological processes that drive performance 
on the IGT, several reinforcement-learning (RL) models have been proposed. The most 
popular model of IGT data is the Expectancy Valence model (EV; Agay et al., 2010; Bass 
& Nussbaum, 2010; Bishara et al., 2009; Brambilla et al., 2012; Brown, Anderson, Sym-
ington, & Paul, 2012; Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Cella, Dymond, Cooper, & Turnbull, 2012; 
de Visser et al., 2010; Escartin et al., 2012; Farah, Yechiam, Bekhor, Toledo, & Polus, 2008; 
Gullo & Stieger, 2011; Hochman, Yechiam, & Bechara, 2010; Isella et al., 2008; Johnson, 
Yechiam, Murphy, Queller, & Stout, 2006; Kester et al., 2006; Kjome et al., 2010; Lane, 
Yechiam, & Busemeyer, 2006; Lev et al., 2008; Lovallo, Yechiam, Sorocco, Vincent, & Col-
lins, 2006; Peatfield, Parkinson, & Intriligator, 2012; Premkumar et al., 2008; Sevy et al., 
2006, 2007; Stout et al., 2004; van den Bos, Homberg, Gijsbers, Heijer, & Cuppen, 2009; 
Wood, Busemeyer, Koling, Cox, & Davis, 2005; Yechiam, Busemeyer, Stout, & Bechara, 
2005; Yechiam, Hayden, Bodkins, O’Donnell, & Hetrick, 2008; Yechiam, Kanz, et al., 2008; 
Yechiam, Arshavsky, Shamay-Tsoory, Yaniv, & Aharon, 2010). Yechiam et al. (2005) fit 
the EV model to data of 10 clinical groups, and mapped these groups according to the 
differences in the model parameters. This analysis shows that modeling IGT data pro-
vides deeper insights in the reasons for the decision-making deficits of the 10 different 
disorders, and in relations between the disorders. The EV model has recently been chal-
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lenged by the Prospect Valence Learning model (PVL; Ahn, Busemeyer, Wagenmakers, & 
Stout, 2008; Ahn, Krawitz, Kim, Busemeyer, & Brown, 2011; a detailed description of the 
models can be found in the next section). Studies comparing these two models failed 
to find that one model was consistently superior to the other; instead they concluded 
that combinations of the two models should be used to fit IGT data (Ahn et al., 2008; 
Fridberg et al., 2010; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005). These studies used various meth-
ods, such as the post hoc fit criterion (Ahn et al., 2008; Fridberg et al., 2010; Yechiam & 
Busemeyer, 2005), the generalization criterion (Ahn et al., 2008; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 
2005), and simulation methods (Fridberg et al., 2010; a detailed review of these studies 
can be found in the next section). 
Here we present a different approach to compare RL models for the IGT. Using a 
method known as parameter space partitioning (PSP; Pitt, Kim, Navarro, & Myung, 2006; 
Pitt, Myung, Montenegro, & Pooley, 2008), we aim to compare the flexibility of three models 
of the IGT: the EV model, PVL model, and a combination of these two models (i.e., EV-PU; 
the EV model with Prospect Utility function of the PVL model, Ahn et al., 2008). We thus 
aim to answer the question: Can each model generate typical empirical choice patterns 
over a wide range of parameter settings? By applying PSP we can gain detailed insights 
in differences between the three models and possible reasons for inconsistent results of 
previous studies comparing these models. 
The outline of this article is as follows. The first section explains the IGT, outlines the 
three RL models for the IGT, and reviews previous studies comparing this class of models. 
In the second section, we compare these three models with respect to model flexibility. 
Section three summarizes our findings and discusses their ramifications. 
The IGT and Three Reinforcement-Learning Models 
The Iowa Gambling Task 
The purpose of the IGT is to measure decision-making deficits of clinical populations in an 
experimental setting. In the traditional IGT, participants are initially given $2000 facsimile 
money and are presented with four decks of cards. Participants are instructed to choose 
cards in order to maximize their long-term outcomes (Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Dama-
sio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). Unbeknowst to the participants, the task typically contains 
100 trials. After each choice, participants receive feedback on the rewards and the losses 
(if any) associated with that card, and the running tally. 
The task aims to determine whether participants learn to prefer the good, safe decks 
over the bad, risky decks because this is the only choice pattern that maximizes the long-
term outcomes. The good, safe decks are typically labelled as decks C and D, whereas 
the bad, risky decks are labelled as decks A and B. Table 1 presents the traditional payoff 
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scheme as developed by Bechara et al. (1994). This table illustrates that decks A and B are 
associated with high immediate, constant rewards, but with even higher unpredictable, 
occasional losses resulting in negative long-term outcomes. Decks C and D, on the other 
hand, are associated with lower immediate, constant rewards, but with even lower un-
predictable, occasional losses and thus result in positive long-term outcomes. In addition 
to the different magnitude of the immediate rewards and occasional losses resulting in 
different long-term outcomes, the decks also differ in the frequency of losses: Two decks 
yield frequent losses (decks A and C) and two decks yield infrequent losses (decks B and D). 
Reinforcement-Learning Models 
In this section, we describe the three RL models we aim to compare with respect to model 
flexibility: the EV, PVL, and EV-PU models. Table 2 contains the equations of each model and 
the psychological interpretation of the free parameters including their ranges. In the fol-
lowing, we describe each model separately; the general idea, however, is that each model 
describes the performance on the IGT through the interaction of distinct psychological 
processes captured by the model parameters. The first assumption of all models is that, 
after each choice, participants evaluate the rewards and losses (if any) associated with 
the just-chosen card by means of a utility function. These momentary utilities are used to 
update expectancies about the utilities of each deck. This updating process entails that 
participants adjust their expectancies based on the new utilities they experience, a pro-
cess described by a learning rule. In the next step, the models assume that the expected 
utilities of each deck are used to guide the choices of the participants. This assumption 
is formalized by the softmax choice rule, also known as the ratio-of-strength choice rule, 
that all three models use to compute the probability of choosing a particular deck on a 
particular trial (Luce, 1959). This rule contains the sensitivity parameter, θ, that indexes the 
extent to which trial-by-trial choices match the expected utilities of the decks. Values of θ 
close to zero indicate a random choice behavior (i.e., strong exploration leading to many 
switches), whereas large values of θ indicate a choice behavior that is strongly determined 
by the expected utilities (i.e., strong exploitation leading to few switches). 
Table 1. Payoff scheme of the traditional IGT as developed by Bechara et al. (1994).
Deck A Deck B Deck C Deck D
Bad deck with 
frequent losses
Bad deck with in-
frequent losses
Good deck with 
frequent losses
Good deck with 
infrequent losses
Reward/trial 100 100 50 50
Number of losses/ 10 
cards
5 1 5 1
Loss/10 cards -1250 -1250 -250 -250
Net outcome/ 
10 cards
-250 -250 250 250
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The Expectancy Valence model
The EV model uses three parameters to formalize its assumptions about participants’ per-
formance on the IGT (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002). The first model assumption is that after 
choosing a card from deck k, k  {1, 2, 3, 4} on trial t, participants compute a weighted 
mean of the experienced rewards, W(t), and losses, L(t), to obtain the utility of deck k on 
trial t, uk(t). The weight that participants assign to losses relative to rewards, w, is the first 
model parameter, and is called the loss aversion parameter. A small value of w, that is, w 
< .5, is characteristic for decision makers who put more weight on the rewards and can 
thus be described as reward-seeking, whereas a large value of w, that is, w > .5, is charac-
teristic for decision makers who put more weight on losses and can thus be described as 
loss-averse (Ahn et al., 2008). 
The EV model assumes that decision makers use the utility of deck k on trial t, uk(t), 
to update only the expected utility of deck k, Evk(t + 1); the expected utilities of the un-
chosen decks are left unchanged. If the experienced utility, uk(t), is higher than expected, 
the expected utility of deck k on trial t + 1 is adjusted upward. If the experienced utility, 
uk(t), is lower than expected, the expected utility of deck k on trial t + 1 is adjusted down-
ward. This updating process is influenced by the second model parameter—the recency 
parameter, a. This parameter quantifies the memory for rewards and losses. A value of 
close to zero indicates slow forgetting and weak recency effects, whereas a value of a 
close to one indicates rapid forgetting and strong recency effects. For all models under 
consideration, we initialized the expectancies of all decks to zero, Evk(0) = 0. This setting 
reflects an absence of prior knowledge about the payoffs of the decks. 
Table 2. Formalization of the three reinforcement-learning models.
Concept Model(s) Model equation Free parameter Range
Utility  
function
EV uk(t) = (1 – w) × W(t) + w × L(t)
w: Loss aversion  
parameter [0, 1]
PVL, EV-PU uk(t) = 
A: Shape parameter 






EV, EV-PU Evk(t + 1) = (1 − a) × Evk(t) + a × uk(t)
a: Recency  
parameter [0, 1]
PVL Evk(t + 1) = a × Evk(t) + δk(t) × uk(t)
a: Recency  
parameter [0, 1]
Choice rule All P[Sk(t + 1)] = 
 
Sensitivity
EV, EV-PU θ(t) = (t/10)c c: Consistency  parameter [–5, 5]
PVL θ = 3c – 1 c: Consistency  parameter [0, 5]
Note. W(t) and L(t) are the rewards and losses, respectively, on trial t. X(t) is the net outcome on trial t, 
X(t) = W(t) − |L(t)|. δk(t) is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if deck k is chosen on trial t and 0 otherwise.
X(t)A   if X(t) ≥ 0
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According to the EV model, the sensitivity θ(t) included in the choice rule, changes 
over trials depending on the response consistency parameter c. If c is positive, the sen-
sitivity of trial-by-trial choices to the expected utilities of the decks increases over trials; 
otherwise, the sensitivity decreases. 
To sum up, the EV model has three parameters: (1) The loss aversion parameter, w, 
which quantifies the weight of losses over rewards, (2) the recency parameter, a, which 
determines the memory for past expectancies, and (3) the response consistency parameter, 
c, which determines the amount of exploration versus exploitation. 
The Prospect Valence Learning model
The PVL model uses four parameters to formalize its assumptions about participants’ 
performance on the IGT (Ahn et al., 2008). The PVL model assumes that decision mak-
ers only process the net outcome after choosing a card from deck k, k  {1, 2, 3, 4} on 
trial t, X(t)= W(t) −|L(t)|. In contrast to the linear utility function of the EV model, the PVL 
model uses the Prospect Utility function—a non-linear utility function from prospect 
theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The Prospect Utility function contains the first two 
model parameters—the shape parameter, A, that determines the shape of the utility 
function, and the loss aversion parameter, w. As A approaches zero, the shape of the 
utility function approaches a step function. The implication of such a step function is 
that given a positive net outcome, X(t), all utilities are similar because they approach 
one, and given a negative net outcome, X(t), all utilities are also similar because they ap-
proach −w. On the other hand, as A approaches one, the subjective utility, uk(t), increases 
in direct proportion to the net outcome, X(t). A value of w larger than one indicates a 
larger impact of losses than rewards on the subjective utility, whereas a value of w of 
one indicates equal impact of losses and rewards. As w approaches zero, the model 
predicts that losses will be neglected. 
Unlike the EV model, the PVL model assumes that, on every trial t, decision makers 
update the expected utilities of every deck according to the Decay-RL rule. This rule 
discounts expectancies of every deck on every trial to an extent depending on the 
recency parameter, a. This means that, in contrast to the EV model, the expectancies 
of the unchosen decks are discounted. The dummy variable in the learning rule, δk, 
ensures that only the current utility of the chosen deck, k, is added to the expectancy 
of that deck. A small value of a indicates rapid forgetting and strong recency effects, 
whereas a large value of a indicates slow forgetting and weak recency effects. Note 
that the interpretation of the recency parameter, a, of the EV model is reversed in the 
PVL model. 
The PVL model assumes a trial-independent sensitivity parameter θ, which depends 
on the final model parameter: response consistency c. Small values of c cause a random 
choice pattern, whereas large values of c cause a deterministic choice pattern. 
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To sum up, the PVL model has four parameters: (1) The shape parameter, A, which 
determines the shape of the utility function, (2) the loss aversion parameter, w, which 
quantifies the weight of losses over rewards, (3) the recency parameter, a, which deter-
mines the memory for past expectancies, and (4) the response consistency parameter, c, 
which determines the amount of exploitation versus exploration. 
The Expectancy Valence model with Prospect Utility function
The EV-PU model is a combination of the EV and PVL models because it uses the utility 
function of the PVL model, but all remaining equations of the EV model (i.e., the learning 
rule and the trial-dependent sensitivity parameter; Ahn et al., 2008). This construction 
results in a model with four parameters: (1) The shape parameter, A, (2) the loss aversion 
parameter, w, (3) the recency parameter, a, and (4) the response consistency parameter, c. 
Previous Comparisons of Reinforcement-Learning Models 
In this section, we review the main results of previous studies that compared com-
ponents of the EV and PVL models. Despite the fact that these studies used similar 
approaches to compare the models (i.e., the post hoc fit criterion, the generalization 
criterion, and a simulation method), their conclusions are inconsistent. First, Yechiam 
and Busemeyer (2005) compared combinations of eight different learning rules with 
three different choice rules, resulting in 24 different models. All 24 models used an 
extended version of the utility function of the EV model in which the weight for wins 
and losses are estimated separately. To compare these models, Yechiam and Busemeyer 
(2005) used the post hoc fit criterion at the individual level and the generalization 
criterion at the group level. The post hoc fit criterion compares the ability of a given 
model to predict the choice on the next trial (based on the information obtained from 
all previous trials) to the same ability of a baseline model.1 This comparison relies on 
the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to account for the differences in the number of 
model parameters. The generalization criterion assesses the accuracy of a given model 
to predict the entire sequence of choices on one task based on parameters estimated 
from another task. The authors concluded that the learning rule of the PVL model is 
superior to the learning rule of the EV model. 
Ahn et al. (2008), on the other hand, compared combinations of the utility functions, 
the learning rules, and the sensitivity functions of the EV and PVL models, resulting in 
eight different models. They used three different methods: (1) The post hoc fit criterion 
at the individual level, (2) the generalization criterion for one step ahead predictions for 
a second task at the individual level, (3) the generalization criterion for predictions of the 
entire sequence of choices of a second task.2 The authors concluded that future studies 
that aim to disentangle psychological processes underlying the IGT should rely on a 
modified version of the EV model: The utility function of the EV model should be replaced 
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by the utility function of the PVL model, but the remaining components of the EV model 
should remain unchanged, a suggestion that gave rise to the EV-PU model. Note that in 
contrast to Yechiam and Busemeyer (2005), Ahn et al. (2008) did not suggest to replace 
the learning rule of the EV model by the learning rule of the PVL model. 
Finally, Fridberg et al. (2010) used the post hoc fit criterion to compare the EV model 
to a modified version of the PVL model, that is, the PVL model with learning rule of the 
EV model. The authors showed that the modified PVL model had a better post hoc fit to 
data of the control group, whereas the EV model had a better post hoc fit to data of the 
experimental group of chronic cannabis abusers. But nevertheless, the EV model had a 
worse post hoc fit to the data of the experimental group than the baseline model. Apart 
from the post hoc fit criterion, Fridberg et al. (2010) also compared the EV model to the 
modified PVL model by means of a simulation method. In this simulation, the authors 
determined the best fitting parameters for each subject and used these parameters 
to generate predictions of that subject’s trial-by-trial deck selections. The simulated 
proportions of deck selections were then compared to the observed proportions. The 
results showed that the modified PVL model simulated the observed choice patterns 
of both groups more accurately than the EV model. The authors thus concluded that 
the modified PVL model better accounts for psychological processes underlying the 
IGT than the EV model. 
To sum up, previous studies failed to find a consistent advantage of one model over 
its competitors. However, they all showed that neither the pure EV model nor the pure 
PVL model should be accepted as the default model to describe IGT data. Instead, previ-
ous studies recommended to use different combinations of the EV and PVL models, but 
it is still unclear which exact combination is most favorable. 
A possible reason for the inconsistencies in previous comparisons of RL models 
might be that these studies based their analyses on data sets that show different choice 
patterns. Whereas healthy participants in the study of Ahn et al. (2008) showed a prefer-
ence for the safe decks (that is, decks C and D) over the risky decks (that is, decks A and B), 
healthy participants of Fridberg et al. (2010) and Yechiam and Busemeyer (2005) showed 
a preference for the decks with infrequent losses (decks B and D) over the decks with 
frequent losses (decks A and C). Hence it seems that comparisons of components of the 
EV and PVL models yield conclusions that depend on the observed choice pattern. This 
indicates that some choice patterns might be more accurately fitted by components of the 
EV model, whereas other choice patterns might be more accurately fitted by components 
of the PVL model. This indication has already been touched upon briefly by Yechiam and 
Busemeyer (2005) who demonstrated that the EV model fails to predict a strong prefer-
ence for bad deck B. This finding has been supported by Fridberg et al. (2010)’s simulation 
showing that the EV model over-predicts the observed proportion of cards chosen from 
decks with high-frequent losses (decks A and C). 
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In order to explore systematically the ability of the different models to handle a 
preference for decks with infrequent losses, we employ the PSP method. This method 
systematically assesses the choice patterns predicted by a given model across its entire 
parameter space and allows us to investigate whether typical empirical choice pat-
terns occupy a major region of the parameter space (Pitt et al., 2006, 2008). Hence the 
results of a PSP study describe how flexible a model is. An ideal model is parsimonious 
and generates only those choice patterns that are observed in experiments. A crucial 
advantage of PSP over previous methods used to compare RL models (Ahn et al., 2008; 
Fridberg et al., 2010; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005)3 is that PSP is a global method enabling 
us to assess the full range of choice patterns a model can generate, whereas previous 
methods are local methods that are restricted to a particular parameter combination 
(Pitt et al., 2006). Our conclusions therefore do not depend on the idiosyncrasies of any 
single data set. 
Before we can interpret the results of a PSP study, we need to know what choice 
patterns are observed empirically. When Bechara et al. (1994) developed the IGT, they 
explicitly assumed the existence of at least two choice patterns: Impaired decision mak-
ers are assumed to prefer risky decks over safe decks, whereas healthy participants are 
assumed to show the reversed choice pattern. However, findings of several studies go 
against this assumption (Caroselli, Hiscock, Scheibel, & Ingram, 2006; Chiu & Lin, 2007; Chiu 
et al., 2008; Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 2006; MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2002; 
Lin, Chiu, Lee, & Hsieh, 2007; Wilder, Weinberger, & Goldberg, 1998; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 
2005). In a recent IGT review article, we showed that healthy participants often display a 
preference for decks with infrequent losses over decks with frequent losses (Steingroever, 
Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann, & Wagenmakers, 2013). This choice pattern corresponds 
to the one shown in the studies of Fridberg et al. (2010) and Yechiam and Busemeyer 
(2005). This suggests that there are at least three different types of typical empirical choice 
patterns that a model of the IGT should produce across a wide range of parameter set-
tings: (1) Preference for good decks over bad decks, {C, D} {A, B}, (2) Preference for bad 
decks over good decks, {A, B}{C, D}, and (3) Preference for decks with infrequent losses 
over decks with frequent losses, {B, D}{A, C}. In addition to capturing the rank order of 
deck preferences, a good RL model of the IGT should also be able to capture the switches 
participants make on the IGT (Zhao & Costello, 2007). In a RL context (Sutton & Barto, 
1998), it is assumed that participants first explore all decks, and then settle down and 
exploit the most profitable ones. This assumption implies that the number of switches 
decreases across trials; however, many data sets failed to show a systematic decrease 
in the number of switches across trials (Steingroever et al., 2013). It is interesting to see 
whether the models also generate a decrease in the number of switches, or whether they 
can generate an explorative behavior with many switches. 
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In this article, we aim to gain more detailed insights in differences between RL models 
for the IGT and possible reasons for inconsistent results of previous studies comparing 
these models. We will therefore compare the EV, PVL, and EV-PU models with respect to 
model flexibility. 
Comparison of the EV, PVL, and EV-PU Models 
Methods 
In order to evaluate the flexibility of the three RL models, we performed a PSP study for 
each model (Pitt et al., 2006, 2008). The PSP method systematically assesses the choice 
patterns predicted by the models across the entire parameter space. To explain PSP, we 
use the example of two hypothetical models with two parameters, θ1 and θ2, as shown in 
Figure 1. The left panel shows a model that can generate three choice patterns, whereas 
the model presented in the right panel is more flexible because it can generate six different 
choice patterns. A model is overly flexible when it can generate not only all choice pat-
terns that are observed empirically, but also choice patterns that are logically possible, 
but never observed. Instead, one should prefer a less flexible model that—ideally—only 
generates choice patterns that are also frequently observed in experiments (Pitt et al., 
2006, 2008). In the case of the IGT, such a model is shown in the left panel of Figure 1. 
Pitt et al. (2006) describe a new search algorithm to implement PSP. In our imple-
mentation we did not use their sophisticated search algorithm, but followed the con-
ceptual idea of PSP, and used a grid search that works as follows: For each model and for 
each parameter, we chose 60 values that were equally spaced over the corresponding 
Figure 1. The partitioned parameter space of two hypothetical models with two parameters, 
θ1 and θ2. Model M1 generates three different patterns. Model M2 is more flexible because 
it generates six different patterns. See text for further explanations.
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parameter range. All combinations of these parameter values were used to generate 
data for 100 synthetic participants completing a 100-trial IGT. The generated data were 
used to compute the average proportions of choices from each deck for each param-
eter combination. For each parameter combination, the choice proportions were then 
sorted in decreasing order to determine the generated rank order of deck preferences. 
We defined five possible choice patterns: (1) Preference for good decks over bad decks, 
that is, {C, D}{A, B}, (2) preference for bad decks over good decks, that is, {A, B}{C, D}, 
(3) preference for decks with infrequent losses over decks with frequent losses, that is, 
{B, D}{A, C}, (4) preference for decks with frequent losses over decks with infrequence 
losses, that is, {A, C}{B, D}, and (5) remaining choice patterns. This definition of choice 
patterns is labeled in the remainder of this article as “broad definition of choice pat-
terns.” Finally, we computed for each model the proportion of the parameter space oc-
cupied by each generated choice pattern. Even though we defined five possible types 
of choice patterns, we assume based on the theory underlying the IGT (Bechara et al., 
1994, 1997) and our IGT review (Steingroever et al., 2013) that a good model for the 
IGT should only generate the first three types of choice patterns, as presented in the 
left panel of Figure 1. 
Note that the above definition of choice patterns only considers the rank order of the 
overall proportions of choices from each deck averaged over 100 repeated data genera-
tions with the same parameter combination. This means that it did not matter whether a 
model generated, for example, a very strong or a very weak preference for the good decks 
over the bad decks. Both generated choice patterns would have been classified as the 
choice pattern “good decks over bad decks,” that is, {C, D}{A, B}. To go beyond this coarse 
classification, we also analyzed the models’ behavior when confronted with pronounced 
deck preferences. To get an indication of pronounced deck preferences shown on the IGT, 
we searched our IGT data pool (N = 394) for participants that chose at least 65% cards from 
either the good decks, the bad decks, or the decks with infrequent losses (Steingroever et 
al., 2013).4 We thus obtained three groups of participants with a pronounced deck prefer-
ence. For each of these three groups, we computed the mean proportions of choices from 
each deck (data are presented in the next section). These mean proportions of choices 
from each deck determine our second definition of choice patterns that is labeled as 
“restricted definition of choice patterns” in the remainder of this article. 
We then determined for each model, the proportion of the parameter space that 
produced pronounced deck preferences according to the “restricted definition of choice 
patterns.” We compared this theoretical popularity of pronounced deck preferences to 
the empirical popularity of deck preferences. 
In addition, we determined the mean proportions of switches during the last 50 trials 
for all parameter combinations that produced pronounced deck preferences according to 
the “restricted definition of choice patterns,” and compared them to the empirical mean 
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proportions of switches. For all analyses in this paper, we scaled the traditional payoffs of 
the IGT as presented in Table 1 by dividing by 100 (cf. Ahn et al., 2011). The codes for the 
PSP studies are available on www.helensteingroever.com. 
Results 
Broad definition of choice patterns
Table 3 presents for each model the proportion of the parameter space occupied by each 
of the five different types of choice patterns. From this table, it is evident that the num-
ber of different choice patterns a model can produce does not differ between the three 
models under consideration. However, if we consider the partitioned parameter spaces, 
we detect substantial differences between the models: In the case of the EV model, the 
choice pattern “good decks over bad decks” is the most central to its overall performance, 
as it occupies the largest part of its parameter space. The second largest part of its pa-
rameter space is occupied by the choice pattern “bad decks over good decks.” However, 
the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent losses” is only generated over a very 
minor part of its parameter space. 
Just as the EV model, the PVL model produces the choice pattern “good decks over 
bad decks” over the largest part of its parameter space. But in contrast to the EV model, 
the PVL model also generates the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent losses” 
over a large part of its parameter space. Note that it seems almost incidental that the PVL 
model produces a preference for the bad decks. Not only does this choice pattern occupy 
a small region of the parameter space, but larger regions are produced by choice patterns 
that are not empirically observed, that is, choice patterns labeled as “remaining.” 
Among the three RL models, the EV-PU model shows the strongest preference for the 
choice pattern “good decks over bad decks.” Hence its parameter space is very unequally 
partitioned among the five different types of choice patterns. The two next largest parts 
of its parameter space are occupied by the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent 
losses” and by “remaining” choice patterns. 
Table 3. Proportions of choice patterns generated by each model.
Choice pattern Proportion of all choice patterns
EV PVL EV-PU
Good ≻ bad decks {C, D}≻{A, B} .585 .427 .661
Bad ≻ good decks {A, B}≻{C, D} .153 .005 .005
Infr. ≻ frequent losses {B, D}≻{A, C} .075 .363 .181
Frequent ≻ infr. losses {A, C}≻{B, D} .099 .003 .003
Remaining .089 .202 .151
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Since the EV model generates the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent 
losses,” and the PVL and EV-PU models the choice pattern “bad decks over good decks” 
only within a very small region of the parameter space, we have grounds to conclude that 
these choice patterns are uncharacteristic of the models, and are thus almost irrelevant to 
their overall performance (Pitt et al., 2006). These findings are especially relevant because 
the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent losses” is often observed in healthy 
participants (Steingroever et al., 2013), and the choice pattern “bad decks over good 
decks” is thought to be characteristic in patients with lesions to the vmPFC (Bechara et 
al., 1994, 1997). 
Restricted definition of choice patterns
Table 4 shows the mean proportions of choices from each deck and the mean proportions 
of switches during the last 50 trials of three groups of healthy participants who showed 
a pronounced preference for either the good decks ((C + D) ≥ .65), the bad decks ((A + B) 
≥ .65), or the decks with infrequent losses ((B+D) ≥ .65). Participants classified into one 
of these three groups were selected out of our IGT data pool (N = 394) (Steingroever et 
al., 2013). By using the .65-criterion, we include participants with pronounced deck pref-
erences and exclude participants with random choice behaviors. Note that 53.6% of all 
participants in our data pool showed a pronounced deck preference, and made at least 
65% choices from the two most preferred decks. This empirical popularity of pronounced 
deck preferences underscores how important it is that an RL model for the IGT is able to 
produce such choice patterns. Table 4 also contains for each group the mean proportions 
of switches during the last 50 trials and statistics quantifying the distribution of switches in 
each group, that is, the interquartile range and the minimum and maximum proportions 
of switches during the last 50 trials. This information is visualized by the boxplots shown in 
the first column of Figure 2. From the table and the figure, it is evident that, in general, in 
all three groups participants switch frequently. However, the interquartile ranges and the 
Table 4. Mean proportions of choices from each deck and mean proportions of switches 
during the last 50 trials of healthy participants showing a pronounced deck preference. 












Switches during the last 50 trials 
[25%, 75% quantile] (min, max)
(C + D) ≥ .65 54 .10 [.05] .14 [.05] .36 [.17] .40 [.14] .35 [.08, .52]
(0.00, 0.96)
(A + B) ≥ .65 18 .25 [.07] .52 [.11] .11 [.05] .12 [.06] .43 [.31, .58]
(0.10, 0.86)
(B + D) ≥ .65 139 .12 [.05] .37 [.12] .13 [.05] .39 [.12] .47 [.28, .66]
(0.02, 1.00)
The Journal of Problem Solving •
14 H. Steingroever, R. Wetzels, & E.-J. Wagenmakers
minimum and maximum proportions of switches during the last 50 trials show that there 
is also a large variability in the proportions of switches, such that the switches of healthy 
participants vary between no switches at all to switches on every trial. This tendency to 
switch frequently, but also the large individual differences in the switch behavior of healthy 
participants are illustrated by Figures 3, 7, and 10 which show the trial-by-trial choices of 
healthy participants with a pronounced preference for the good decks, bad decks, and 
decks with infrequent losses, respectively. The deck selection profiles of all healthy par-
ticipants that showed a pronounced deck preference, that is, at least 65% choices from 
the two most preferred decks, can be found in the online appendix.5 
The mean proportions of choices shown in Table 4 were used to investigate whether 
the models can also generate these pronounced deck preferences. This means that we 
Figure 2. Boxplots of observed and generated proportions of switches during the last 50 
trials. Each row presents the results for different choice patterns: First row: Pronounced 
preference for the good decks; second row: Pronounced preference for the bad decks; third 
row: Pronounced preference for the decks with infrequent losses. The first column presents 
the switches of 211 healthy participants selected out of our IGT data pool (Steingroever 
et al., 2013) (cf. Table 4). The remaining columns present the switches generated by the 
EV, PVL, and EV-PU models (cf. Table 5). A cell is unfilled if the corresponding model fails 
to generate the corresponding choice pattern.
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searched the results of the PSP studies for those parameter combinations that yielded 
pronounced deck preference as presented in Table 4, that is, a pronounced preference 
for the good decks (C ≥ .36,D ≥ .40), a pronounced preference for the bad decks (A ≥ 
.25,B ≥ .52), and a pronounced preference for the decks with infrequent losses (B ≥ 
.37,D ≥ .39). Table 5 presents for each model the proportion of all choice patterns that 
satisfied this “restricted definition of choice patterns.” The table also presents the mean 
and standard deviation of the parameter combinations that generated these pronounced 
deck preferences, and the corresponding generated proportions of switches during 
the last 50 trials. 
Table 5. Proportion of choice patterns generated by each model that satisfy the “restricted 
definition of choice patterns”. Note that this definition is only based on the mean propor-
tions of switches of the two strongest preferred decks (second column). For the selected 
choice patterns, the corresponding mean and standard deviation of the model parameters, 
and the mean proportions of switches during the last 50 trials are presented.
Model Choice  
pattern
Proportion 
of all choice 
patterns
A [sd] w [sd] a [sd] c [sd] Switches during the 
last 50 trials  
[25%, 75% quantile] 
(min, max)
EV C ≥ .36, 
D ≥ .40
.00027 .45 [.04] .04 [.02] 3.76 [0.67] .020
[.0016, .017]
(.00020, .19)
A ≥ .25, 
B ≥ .52
.00013 .04 [.03] .15 [.07] 2.66 [0.49] .032
[.00060, .013]
(.00, .35)
B ≥ .37, 
D ≥ .39
none
PVL C ≥ .36, 
D ≥ .40
.010 .66 [.22] .74 [.41] .78 [.16] 3.21 [1.14] .0065
[.0002, .0054]
(.00, .34)
A ≥ .25, 
B ≥ .52
.0000035 .92 [.07] .02 [.03] .95 [.05] 0.79 [0.15] .0018
[.00, .0034]
(.00, .015)
B ≥ .37, 
D ≥ .39
.016 .29 [.25] .46 [.76] .50 [.29] 2.41 [1.24] .042
[.0020, .0468]
(.00, .46)
EV-PU C ≥ .36, 
D ≥ .40
.0019 .66 [.21] .63 [.34] .29 [.19] 3.41 [1.00] .067
[.014, .092]
(.00, .46)
A ≥ .25, 
B ≥ .52
none
B ≥ .37, 
D ≥ .39
.0080 .17 [.19] .52 [.42] .30 [.22] 2.70 [0.97] .10
[.0150, .130]
(.00, .67)
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Figure 3. Deck selection profiles of four healthy participants showing a preference for the 
good decks. The filled circles indicate the occurrence of rewards and losses together; the 
empty circles indicate the occurrence of only rewards.
Figure 4. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for 
the good decks (generated by the EV model; w = 0.42, a = 0.03, c = 5.00).
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Figure 5. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for 
the good decks (generated by the PVL model; A = .97,w = .93, a = .93, c = .59).
Figure 6. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for the 
good decks (generated by the EV-PU model; A = 0.81,w = 0.34, a = 0.24, c = 5.00).
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Figure 7. Deck selection profiles of four healthy participants showing a preference for the 
bad decks.
Figure 8. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for 
the bad decks (generated by the EV model; w = 0.00, a = 0.25, c = 1.61).
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Figure 9. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for 
the bad decks (generated by the PVL model; A = 1.00,w = 0.00, a = 0.88, c = 0.76).
Figure 10. Deck selection profiles of four healthy participants showing a preference for 
the decks with infrequent losses.
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Figure 11. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for the 
decks with infrequent losses (generated by the PVL model; A = .07,w = .25, a = .88, c = .34).
Figure 12. Deck selection profiles of four synthetic participants showing a preference for 
the decks with infrequent losses (generated by the EV-PU model; A = 0.03,w = 0.08, a = 
0.36, c = 4.66).
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From this table, it seems at a first glance that all models are able to generate all 
pronounced deck preferences over a minor part of their parameter space, except for the 
EV model that fails to generate a pronounced preference for the decks with infrequent 
losses and for the EV-PU model that fails to generate a pronounced preference for the bad 
decks.6
 
For the remaining two pronounced choice patterns of the EV and EV-PU models 
and for all three pronounced choice patterns of the PVL model, it is important to note that 
only minor parts of the parameter spaces of all models are occupied by the choice pat-
terns featuring pronounced deck preferences even though they are frequently observed 
in experiments. For instance, 139 healthy participants out of our data pool (35.3%) show 
a pronounced preference for the decks with infrequent losses ((B + D) ≥ .65). However, 
the EV model completely fails to generate such a pronounced preference for the decks 
with infrequent losses, the PVL model only generates this choice pattern over 1.6% of its 
parameter space, and the EV-PU model only over 0.8% of its parameter space. 
Next to considering the proportion of the parameter space occupied by each choice 
pattern featuring pronounced deck preferences, it is crucial to consider the proportions 
of switches during the last 50 trials predicted by each model. The last column of Table 5 
shows for each model and each choice pattern separately, the proportions of switches 
during the last 50 trials averaged over all selected parameter combinations, and statistics 
quantifying the corresponding distribution of switches, that is, the interquartile range 
and the minimum and maximum proportions of switches during the last 50 trials. This 
information is visualized by the last three columns of Figure 2. When comparing the gen-
erated and observed mean proportions of switches during the last 50 trials, it is apparent 
that the models dramatically underestimate the observed proportions of switches, that 
is, the generated mean proportions of switches equal or fall below .10 for all models and 
all choice patterns, whereas the observed mean proportions of switches equal or exceed 
.35 for all choice patterns (Tables 4 and 5). In addition, only in the case of the EV-PU model 
and the choice pattern featuring a pronounced preference for the good decks do the 
interquartile range of the observed proportions of switches and generated proportions 
of switches overlap; for all other choice patterns and models, the interquartile ranges of 
the generated proportions of switches lie below the interquartile ranges of the observed 
proportions of switches (Figure 2, Table 4 and 5). 
Figure 2 and Table 5 also reveal important differences between the models: First, the 
EV model performs worse among the three models; even if we neglect the generated pro-
portions of switches during the last 50 trials and only consider the generated rank order of 
deck preferences, the EV model fails to generate a frequency-of-losses effect. In addition, 
it predicts, among the three models, the smallest number of switches when generating a 
pronounced preference for the good decks over the bad decks. In fact, the deck selection 
profiles that were generated with the EV model and those parameter values that yielded 
the largest number of switches and a pronounced preference for the good decks, display 
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few switches during the last 50 trials and long stays on the same deck for four synthetic 
participants showing a pronounced preference for the good decks (Figure 4). This strong 
exploitation is due to the high consistency parameter, c, and the low recency parameter, 
a, suggesting almost no forgetting and very weak recency effects. However, with respect 
to the choice pattern featuring a pronounced preference for the bad decks, the EV model 
outperforms its competitors. Even though the EV model in general underestimates the mean 
proportions of switches during the last 50 trials, it best approximates the observed mean 
proportion of choices among the three models (Figure 2, Tables 4 and 5). In fact, the deck 
selection profiles that were generated with the EV model and those parameter values that 
yielded the largest number of switches and a pronounced preference for the bad decks, 
strongly resemble the deck selection profiles of healthy participants (Figures 7 and 8). 
Second, the PVL model outperforms the EV model because it can generate a 
frequency-of-losses effect, and for pronounced preferences from the good decks or the 
decks with infrequent losses, the PVL model’s largest generated proportions of switches 
lies in interquartile ranges of the observed proportions of switches (cf. Figure 2, Tables 
4 and 5). This suggests that for very rare parameter combinations the PVL model meets 
both empirical regularities: the rank order of deck preferences and the proportions of 
switches. This is illustrated by Figures 5 and 11 showing deck selection profiles featuring 
pronounced preferences for the good decks and decks with infrequent losses, respectively. 
These deck selection profiles were generated with the PVL model and those parameter 
values that yielded the largest number of switches and a pronounced preference for the 
good decks or the decks with infrequent losses. However, the deck selection profiles 
featuring a pronounced preference for the bad decks show that, for this choice pattern, 
the PVL fails to meet both empirical regularities in that it generates almost no switches 
during the last 50 trials (Figure 9). This is supported by Figure 2 and Tables 4 and 5 show-
ing that, for choice patterns featuring a pronounced preference from the bad decks, the 
largest generated proportions of switches is smaller than the 25% quantile of the observed 
proportions of switches. 
Third, the EV-PU model is clearly inferior to the EV and PVL models with respect to the 
choice pattern featuring a pronounced preference for the bad decks. But it outperforms its 
competitors with respect to the choice patterns featuring a pronounced preference of the 
good decks and the decks with infrequent losses; even though all models underestimate 
the observed proportions of switches during the last 50 trials, the EV-PU model comes 
closest to the observed proportions of switches. This indicates that for very rare param-
eter combinations the EV-PU model can account for both empirical regularities: the rank 
order of deck preferences and the proportions of switches. This is illustrated by Figures 6 
and 12 showing the deck selection profiles of synthetic participants with a pronounced 
preference for the good decks and for the decks with infrequent losses, respectively, that 
were generated with the EV-PU model and with those parameter values that yielded the 
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largest number of switches. A surprising finding of these deck selection profiles, is that the 
EV-PU model predicts many switches during the last 50 trials, but a long stay at the same 
deck at the first half of the task. This might be due to the interaction between the high 
consistency parameter, c, that predicts strong exploitation, and the small recency param-
eter, a, that strongly discounts all past expectancies and disables strong learning effects. 
To conclude, many healthy participants out of our data pool (53.6%) showed pro-
nounced deck preferences, that is, a pronounced preference for good decks ((C + D) ≥ .65), 
a pronounced preference for bad decks ((A + B) ≥ .65), or a pronounced preference for decks 
with infrequent losses ((B + D) ≥ .65) (Table 4). This empirical popularity of pronounced deck 
preferences is not reflected by the three RL models; the models produce choice patterns 
that satisfy the “restricted definition of choice patterns” only within minor parts of their pa-
rameter spaces (Table 5). In addition, healthy participants in general show many switches 
during the last 50 trials. However, the RL models in general predict that participants, who 
show pronounced deck preferences switch vary rarely during the last 50 trials; all generated 
mean proportions of switches during the last 50 trials equal or fall below .10 whereas the 
observed mean proportions of switches lie around .40. Moreover, there are large individual 
differences in the proportions of switches of healthy participants, such that the switches 
of healthy participants vary between no switches at all to switches on every trial. However, 
the RL models fail to generate large proportions of switches, that is, none of the models can 
generate more than 67% switches during the last 50 trials. 
Discussion 
This article compared the EV, PVL, and EV-PU models with respect to model flexibility using 
parameter space partitioning. We used two different definitions of choice patterns; the broad 
definition allowed us to get an indication of how central each of the choice patterns are to the 
models’ overall performance, and the restricted definition allowed us to assess the models’ 
data-fitting potential when confronted with data featuring pronounced deck preferences. 
The analysis based on the broad definition of choice patterns showed that the parti-
tioned parameter spaces of the three models differ. We thus learned that the choice pat-
tern “good decks over bad decks” is the most central to all models. But the popularity of 
this choice pattern differs between the models; the part of the parameter space occupied 
by this choice pattern is the largest in the case of the the EV-PU model (66.1%), and the 
smallest in the case of the PVL model (42.7%). Another important difference between the 
three models is that the choice pattern “infrequent losses over frequent losses” is almost 
irrelevant to the overall performance of the EV model, whereas the choice pattern “bad 
decks over good decks” is almost irrelevant to the overall performance of the PVL and EV-
PU models. We were thus able to detect inconsistencies between the empirical frequency 
of each choice pattern and the frequency predicted by each model. 
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The analysis based on the restricted definition of choice patterns showed that all three 
models dramatically underestimate the empirical popularity of pronounced deck prefer-
ences, that is, a pronounced preference for good decks (C ≥ .36, D ≥ .40), a pronounced 
preference for bad decks (A ≥ .25, B ≥ .52), and a pronounced preference for decks with 
infrequent losses (B ≥ .37, D ≥ .39). Another finding of the analysis based on the restricted 
definition of choice patterns was that the EV model is the worst performing model among 
the three models that were compared in this article; it fails to generate a frequency-of-
losses effect, and predicts very few switches when generating a pronounced preference 
for the good decks. Yet, a major advantage of the EV model is that it outperforms its com-
petitors with respect to the choice pattern featuring a pronounced preference for the bad 
decks because the EV model can generate the largest range of switches during the last 
50 trials. The EV-PU model, on the other hand, is the best model; comparing the ability of 
the three models to generate choice patterns featuring pronounced deck preferences, 
we found that all models underestimate the empirical popularity of such choice patterns, 
but also the proportions of switches during the last 50 trials; however, among the three 
models the EV-PU model best approximates the observed proportions of switches. Yet, a 
major disadvantage of the EV-PU model is that it fails to generate a pronounced preference 
for the bad decks (A ≥ .25, B ≥ .52). Thus, none of the three RL models met all empirical 
regularities, that is, pronounced deck preferences from either the good decks, the bad 
decks, or the decks with infrequent losses, and many switches during the last 50 trials. 
The results of the PSP studies reveal important differences in the data-fitting potential 
of the three RL models. These findings are useful for future applications of the models. 
Based on the behavioral results, researches can decide which model is most appropriate. 
For instance, our findings suggest that the EV model should not be used if the data set is 
characterized by a strong preference for the decks with infrequent losses.
The differences in the data-fitting potential of the three models might explain why 
previous comparisons of RL models found inconsistent results. Our finding that the EV 
model fails to generate a frequency-of-losses effect is in line with the studies of Fridberg 
et al. (2010) and Yechiam and Busemeyer (2005). These two studies show that the EV 
model is outperformed by its competitors when participants show a strong preference 
for decks with infrequent losses (decks B and D) over decks with frequent losses (deck A 
and C). However, in the study of Ahn et al. (2008) participants prefer the good decks over 
the bad decks and the authors recommend to use the EV-PU model instead of the PVL 
and EV models. This finding is also in line with our PSP studies because the choice pattern 
“good decks over bad decks” is the most central in the case of the EV-PU model. 
An important advantage of PSP is that it is a global analysis technique augmenting 
local methods that have previously been used to compare RL models (Pitt et al., 2006, 2008). 
Whereas local methods, such as the post hoc fit criterion or the generalization criterion, evalu-
ate a model’s performance at a single point of a model’s parameter space, global methods 
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such as PSP help us to determine the full range of choice patterns that a model can generate 
by varying its parameter values (see also Vanpaemel, 2009). This means that we can obtain 
a global perspective on a model’s data-fitting potential. In addition, PSP allows us to draw 
conclusions about model flexibility that transcend the idiosyncrasies of any particular data 
set. We can use the results of the presented PSP studies to predict how well each of the three 
models will fit a certain data set only based on the behavioral findings. Thus, based on the 
observed choice pattern, we can decide which model is most appropriate. 
One might argue that it is not surprising that the EV model fails to outperform its 
competitors, a failure that is due to the EV model having one free parameter less than its 
competitors. This implies that our comparison of RL models might not be fair because PSP 
does not correct for the number of free parameters. Even though we agree that PSP might 
disadvantage the EV model, it is important to bear in mind that previous comparisons of 
RL models based on methods that corrected for the number of free parameters (e.g., the 
post hoc fit criterion), also failed to find that the EV model is superior to its competitors 
(Ahn et al., 2008; Fridberg et al., 2010; Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005). In addition, our goal 
was not a model-selection exercise in which the emphasis is on relative performance. 
Instead, we were primarily conceded with absolute measure of the models’ performance, 
that is do the models account for the key regularities of the experimental data? 
It should also be noted that the PSP results of this paper should be interpreted care-
fully. PSP gives an indication of how central choice patterns are to the overall performance 
of the model. But, when a model generates a certain choice pattern only over a small part 
of the parameter space, it is premature to conclude that the model cannot generate this 
choice pattern at all. Instead, we can only conclude that this choice pattern is not central 
to the model’s overall performance. Moreover, a model that generates nonhuman-like 
choice patterns for certain parameter combinations is not necessarily inadequate. 
The findings of this article offer several suggestions for future research. First, we 
found that the three RL models have difficulties in generating pronounced deck prefer-
ences, even though these choice patterns are frequently found in empirical research on 
the IGT. This suggests that a better model is required if researchers aim to decompose 
performance on the IGT in its constituent psychological processes using RL models. Such a 
model should be able to produce the large diversity of choice patterns shown on the IGT, 
and it should also be able to produce the switches made on the IGT. However, developing 
a model that well accounts for IGT data might be very challenging because there are large 
individual differences in the data, and, at the same time, there are only a small number of 
trials providing a limited amount of information (Steingroever et al., 2013). 
A second possible approach would be to work on the level of the task. The IGT 
is a popular neuropsychological task that has been applied in many studies to assess 
decision-making deficits of clinical populations (Bowman, Evans, & Turnbull, 2005; Toplak, 
Sorge, Benoit, West, & Stanovich, 2010). Yet, the IGT has been confronted by a substantial 
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number of criticism (Chiu & Lin, 2007; Chiu et al., 2008; Dunn et al., 2006; Lin et al., 2007; 
Steingroever et al., 2013). It is therefore desirable to develop a neuropsychological task 
that measures risky decision making in an experimental context and that circumvents 
some of the problems of the IGT. As such, the new task should reduce the within-group 
variability resulting in more homogeneous response profiles. 
Third, no matter in which direction future research proceeds, it is important that re-
searchers rigorously assess absolute model fit. To date, more than 30 studies have fit the 
EV or PVL models to IGT data to compare two or more groups (Agay et al., 2010; Ahn et 
al., 2011; Bass & Nussbaum, 2010; Bishara et al., 2009; Brambilla et al., 2012; Brown et al., 
2012; Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Cella et al., 2012; de Visser et al., 2010; Escartin et al., 2012; 
Farah et al., 2008; Fridberg et al., 2010; Gullo & Stieger, 2011; Hochman et al., 2010; Isella 
et al., 2008; Johnson et al., 2006; Kester et al., 2006; Kjome et al., 2010; Lane et al., 2006; 
Lev et al., 2008; Lovallo et al., 2006; Peatfield et al., 2012; Premkumar et al., 2008; Sevy et 
al., 2006, 2007; Stout et al., 2004; van den Bos et al., 2009; Wood et al., 2005; Yechiam et 
al., 2005; Yechiam, Hayden, et al., 2008; Yechiam, Kanz, et al., 2008; Yechiam et al., 2010). 
About one third of these studies did not report the model fit at all. The remaining studies 
assessed the model fit by comparing the EV or PVL model to a baseline model and thus 
obtained a fit statistic, e.g., G2 or BIC (for example, Farah et al., 2008; Yechiam, Kanz, et al., 
2008). The problem of such fit statistics is that they only assess the fit of one model rela-
tive to the fit of another model. Another approach is to plot the observed and predicted 
choices as a function of trial number (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002; Wood et al., 2005). These 
two studies, however, collapsed choice proportions over the two good decks, a procedure 
that leads to a loss of potentially diagnostic information. To determine whether a model 
fits the data well, it is important to assess the model fit for each deck separately as a func-
tion of the trial number. Only a good model fit allows us to draw valid conclusion from 
the model parameters. Especially comparisons of several groups are only meaningful if 
the model fits the data of all groups well. 
The findings of this paper showed that the search for an IGT model has not yet come 
to an end. Applying PSP to three different RL models, we have obtained a deeper under-
standing of the models’ behavior. The results of the PSP studies allow us to predict each 
model’s data-fitting potential by only considering behavioral characteristics of the data, 
that is, mean proportions of choices from each deck and mean proportions of switches 
during the last 50 trials. Each model was demonstrated to provide a good fit to only a 
restricted number of choice patterns. In particular, the EV model provided a poor fit to 
choice patterns featuring a preference for decks with infrequent losses, whereas the PVL 
and EV-PU models provided a poor fit to choice patterns featuring a pronounced preference 
for the bad decks with many switches. This work suggests that a deeper understanding 
of risky decision making requires a better interplay between the current version of the 
IGT and RL models. 
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Notes
1. The baseline model assumes that a participant’s probability of choosing a given deck 
on a given trial equals the overall proportion of choices the participant actually made 
from that deck.
2. For the third method, data was generated for each subject individually, but eventu-
ally averaged over all subjects to compute the predicted proportions of choices from 
each deck on each trial.
3. See Yechiam and Busemeyer (2008) and Yechiam and Ert (2007) for newly developed 
methods to compare RL models applied to experiments with two and three choice 
options, respectively.
4. Note that we did not use the data of Rodríguez-Sánchez et al. (2005), and Toplak et al. 
(2005) because we have received their data only in bins of several trials.
5. The deck selection profiles can be downloaded here: https://dl.dropbox.
com/u/12798592/DeckSelectionProfilesPSP.zip
6. The EV model already fails to generate a weak frequency-of-losses effect with 28% 
choices from each decks B and D. The EV-PU model already fails to produce a weak 
preference for the bad decks with 27% choices from each decks A and B.
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